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The essential question confronting American conservatism is what, precisely, it aspires to conserve. The ascension of Donald J. Trump not 
just to the Oval Office but also to the leadership of America’s traditionally 
conservative party compels a serious confrontation of that question. He is 
not conservative in the senses in which the term has typically been under-
stood. He is opposed to many dimensions of economic freedom, resists 
entitlement reform, and seems at best unaware of notions of constitutional 
limitation. 
Greg Weiner is assistant professor of political science at Assumption College and the author of American Burke: 
The Uncommon Liberalism of Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
But what in the age of Trumpism—which 
is, if nothing else, an age of upheaval—are 
conservatives to conserve? The answer must 
be the constitutional regime underlying policy 
disputes that otherwise draw all emphasis into 
their impetuous vortex. Policy disputes are 
transient; the constitutional principles that 
frame and shape them endure. By focusing on 
constitutionalism, conservatives can emulate 
the Framers’ tradition of conserving reform 
that binds generations. Despite the common 
belief that the American regime was cast in 
the crucible of abstract philosophy, the Fram-
ers at Philadelphia in fact carefully adapted 
long-standing colonial forms. James Madison 




Will Republicans on Capitol Hill reclaim their 
right—and responsibility—to legislate?
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as an intergenerational compact through 
which the dead could obligate the living.
By any conventional measure, the signs 
for constitutionalism are inauspicious. A 
single party controls all elective mechanisms 
of government, and its appointees may soon 
hold a working majority on the Supreme 
Court as well. The president is a populist 
interested in maintaining an unmediated 
relationship with the public. Congressional 
majorities have historically lain supine before 
presidents of their own party. Yet as Geof-
frey Vaughan, Daniel Stid, and others have 
argued, one benefit of the Trump presidency 
may be a congressional revival. There are 
intriguing reasons to believe this is actu-
ally conservatism’s constitutional moment. 
Single-party rule in which members of Con-
gress are known to disagree substantively 
with the president on major issues sets up a 
unique constitutional experiment that will 
test, without the obfuscating variable of par-
tisan opposition, the Republican commit-
ment to constitutional process. That is not 
to say congressional Republicans will always 
oppose the president, and still less that they 
should seek reasons to. Where they agree, 
collaboration is appropriate. Where Trump’s 
policy agenda is vague, as Yuval Levin has 
perceptively noted, they can inform it. But 
even in cooperation, they can insist on a 
leading role for Congress. In opposition, 
they should especially do so.
This is not to say that all Republicans are 
conservative, or that all conservatives are 
Republican. Neither is the case. But conserv-
ing Democrats are increasingly rare. A pres-
ervation of conservatism as a philosophical 
force depends on a Republican Party willing 
to mount a moral defense of it. Republicans 
have both an opportunity and a responsi-
bility to demonstrate that their rhetorical 
commitment to constitutionalism and not 
merely to policy preferences or, worse, power 
is meaningful. This is the clearest test in gen-
erations of the endurance of the Philadelphia 
regime against a creeping parliamentarism 
under which party loyalties run roughshod 
over institutional forms. Conservatives will 
not deserve power if they fail it.
Giving the legislature its due
The separation of powers is the hinge of 
this test. It is fitting that the concept itself 
as received in the United States was not an 
innovation of theoretical abstraction but 
rather a product of political necessity: the 
sharing of power between deeply rooted 
social classes in the mother country, a 
mechanism whose theoretical advantages 
Montesquieu—the most quoted philoso-
pher of the founding period, Donald Lutz 
found—noticed and most fully developed. 
The separation of powers, in turn, assumes 
the legislature’s priority in setting policy. 
Even by way of defending executive energy 
in Federalist No.  70, Alexander Hamilton 
specifies that the president should imple-
ment with speed precisely because the legis-
lature has first decided with deliberation. 
James Madison, later at war with Hamilton 
over the extent of presidential authority in 
the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, writes: “The 
natural province of the executive magistrate 
is to execute laws, as that of the legislature is 
to make laws. All his acts therefore, properly 
executive, must presuppose the existence of 
the laws to be executed.” 
To be sure, Federalist No. 73 praises the 
president’s veto as “an additional security 
against the enactment of improper laws. It 
establishes a salutary check upon the legisla-
tive body, calculated to guard the commu-
nity against the effects of faction, precipi-
tancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the 
public good, which may happen to influence 
a majority of that body.” The suggestion is 
of a presidency that serves as an occasional 
break on the impulses of the legislature. The 
practice is now reversed. The contemporary 
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assumption is of a presidential regime the 
Congress periodically checks.
It too rarely does even that much. Even in 
explicit opposition, for example, a Republican 
Congress did not answer President Obama’s 
executive unilateralism on immigration with 
legislative retaliation, for which its tools are 
ample. Members asked the courts to retali-
ate for them. (A statement from Speaker 
Paul Ryan’s office offered the breathless if 
anticlimactic promise that “the House will 
take an unprecedented step to stop President 
Obama’s executive overreach. That’s right: In 
the coming weeks, the House will vote on 
filing an amicus brief.”) Congress was list-
less, other than oratorically, when Obama 
used regulation to rewrite sections of the 
Affordable Care Act and unapologetically 
acknowledged that he was doing so because 
Republicans controlled Congress.
It may, ironically, take a president of their 
own party with whom Congress disagrees 
on a variety of important issues to restore 
the tension between branches that the sepa-
ration of powers assumes. The first shot in 
what could be this emergent battle was fired 
a week after Election Day, when Trump 
economic adviser Stephen Moore, late of 
the Club for Growth and suddenly of the 
school of protectionism, is reported to have 
announced summarily to House Republican 
whips that they now belonged to the party of 
Donald Trump, not of Ronald Reagan. In a 
report of the incident in The Hill, there is no 
record of dissent, only of astonishment.
This may reflect lingering wonder at 
Trump’s ascent, but an initial reply—more 
on a constitutional one presently—might 
have noted that House Republicans garnered 
a three-million-vote majority in ballots cast 
for Congress, as against Trump’s almost 
three-million‒vote deficit in the popular 
vote for president. Trump wields a superior 
mandate only if it is measured in the incre-
dulity gap that separated expectations from 
results in his victory.
To be sure, that is not to say that the pub-
lic concerns into which Trump tapped are 
wholly to be dismissed on the grounds of a 
free-market dogmatism ill-suited to the tem-
perament and perhaps the economics of the 
moment. But there is a difference between 
what Walter Lippmann called a “directed” 
and a “compensated” economy, the former of 
which seeks to rearrange markets to political 
purposes and the latter of which recognizes, 
So much for congressional supremacy
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and thus seeks to insure individuals against, 
their shortcomings. As Lippmann noted, even 
Franklin Roosevelt abandoned his aspirations 
to direct the economy. Trump seems to har-
bor such aspirations once more. The middle 
ground that congressional Republicans can 
strike is a robust, if market-oriented, system 
of social insurance that recognizes that there 
is no better system of distributing goods and 
services than markets, but they are not always 
ideal means of meeting all material needs.
In any event, some disagreements persist, 
and now both sides face a clarifying moment. 
Do Republicans on Capitol Hill intend to 
pay Trump deference on policy in those areas 
where they disagree, or reclaim their right—
and responsibility—to legislate? The question 
would be obscured if they agreed with him 
across the board on policy, since they would 
appear simply to be falling in line. But they do 
not. Trump is a protectionist who thinks the 
power of government is appropriately used to 
dictate where goods are made, bought, and 
sold. Indeed, one of his first achievements 
as president-elect was to pressure a private 
company to locate manufacturing jobs where 
he felt they should be rather than where the 
diffuse preferences of buyers and sellers in 
the market dictated. Congressional conserva-
tives, by contrast, have long campaigned on 
a philosophical commitment to open trade 
that is rooted politically—economic liberty 
is a bulwark against political tyranny, in no 
small part because a government empowered 
to limit commercial freedom has the capacity 
to limit other kinds too—as well as economi-
cally. Trump’s voters depend on affordable 
imported goods, and what wages they stand 
to gain from the manufacturing jobs he 
alleges he has the power to restore would not 
begin to offset the inflation they would face 
from the trade wars he certainly has the abil-
ity to spark. 
There are indications of other disagree-
ments. It is difficult to see how the party 
that opposed the Obama stimulus can 
endorse Trump’s $1  trillion infrastructure 
plan dictated not by actual needs for major 
projects but rather by Keynesian economics. 
An assumption that the market cannot build 
the Hoover Dam is one thing. It is entirely 
another to say that economic growth is best 
served by extracting funds from the economy 
through taxation and public borrowing, then 
pooling them for centralized political redi-
rection. On Trump’s signature issue of immi-
gration, meanwhile, conservatism is commit-
ted to national sovereignty and thus rejects 
the idea that to preserve borders is inherently 
chauvinistic. Still, there are ample prudential 
and philosophical reasons to oppose a border 
wall and massive deportations. This opposi-
tion is already long recorded among at least 
some Republicans on Capitol Hill.
Of course, elections realign beliefs. They 
are supposed to. Moreover, presidents have 
inherent rhetorical advantages in the pro-
motion of policy. It would be little surprise 
if some congressional Republicans came 
around to Trumpism. Something would be 
amiss if none did. Nor is there any call for 
gratuitous opposition where conservatives 
can more constructively inform Trump’s 
agenda than oppose it. Regardless, the con-
ditions are ripe for deep differences of opin-
ion between the White House and Capitol 
Hill on at least some issues. 
Since the differences are not obscured by 
partisan disputes, it is likelier that their terms 
can be understood to be constitutional. Had 
Trump faced a Democratic Congress, or 
a President Clinton a Republican one, the 
constitutional differences would have been 
impossible to see for the partisan ones. The 
situation of single-party control, however, 
accentuates the constitutional dynamics. 
Even if congressional Republicans stand up 
for Congress’s authority solely for the sake 
of preserving their power to pursue policies 
in which they believe, rather than high con-
stitutional principle, they will be operating 
on the motive of ambition that Madison 
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assumes will drive the separation of pow-
ers. Power might explain their motives, but 
partisanship would not. And if power is the 
point, constitutionalism prevails.
Dusting off  The Federalist Papers
Thus, what would have been the constitu-
tional response to Moore’s announcement 
that Trump had displaced Reagan? Whether 
House Republicans belong to the party of 
Reagan or the party of Trump, they first 
belong to the institution of Congress. They 
do not answer to presidents; they are, on 
the contrary, duty-bound constitutionally to 
resist attempts to enlarge executive author-
ity beyond its proper bounds. The political 
theory of the Constitution assumes they will. 
It consequently does not recognize political 
party and arguably assumes its absence: in 
other words, that institutional interests will 
trump ideological ones.
Federalist No.  51 presumes this when it 
assumes institutional loyalty: not merely 
that each branch will defend itself but also 
that individual members of each branch will 
defend themselves. Institutional loyalty, on 
this understanding, is not altruistic. The 
“ambition” that “must be made to counteract 
ambition,” according to Federalist No. 51, is 
personal, and the ambition is the exercise of 
power by political man. George  W. Carey, 
a frequent contributor to these pages, used 
to illustrate the point in this way: suppose 
a presidential candidate who, driven solely 
by a private lust for the mansion at 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue, fleet of jets, and bud-
get for state dinners, bargains his authority 
to Congress in exchange for a mess of elec-
toral support. That is difficult to imagine 
because we take it for granted that power is 
what motivates presidents: we hope for good 
purposes, perhaps for ill, but power nonethe-
less. They consequently jealously guard the 
office’s authority.
The same drive is supposed to motivate 
Congress. Senators and representatives are 
not presumed to want the job if not for 
the power it confers. Madison, writing in 
The Federalist at a time predating a capital 
with imperial pretensions and a Congress 
with material inducements, can imagine no 
other. Perhaps we can. Glamor attaches to 
the national government, at least to elective 
or high appointive office under it. So does 
remuneration—if not for the job itself, then 
for the career options that follow. 
The supreme irony of congressional abdi-
cation is that Congress’s glamor derives from 
the aura of power, which can be maintained 
only by surrendering its substance. In the 
pursuit of reelection, members have divested 
themselves of the authority that makes 
reelection worthwhile. They have delegated 
broad swaths of it to the executive in ways 
that maintain what we might call Govern-
ment by Press Release: the ability to proclaim 
broad goals while carping about the specific 
exercises of authority they require. In other 
cases, members of Congress conclude that 
their political success is aligned with that of 
a president of their party, such that marching 
in lockstep behind his authority and agenda 
serves their mutual interests. The permanent 
campaign for the congressional majority, 
similarly, entails either capitulation to the 
president or obstruction of him, depending 
on the partisan circumstances.
The consequent question is what good 
either reelection or the majority are since 
they do not occasion the exercise of power. 
More charitably, the common assump-
tion is that Congress does not stand up 
for itself because it is burdened with a 
collective-action problem by which no indi-
vidual will incur the concentrated costs of 
defending Congress because the benefits of 
doing so are diffuse. But any body of any 
size faces the same problem, and as late as 
1887 Woodrow Wilson was complaining 
of decades of congressional ascendancy in 
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American politics, collective-action dilem-
mas notwithstanding. As Jeffrey  K. Tulis 
has noted, the collective-action explanation 
cannot account for these long stretches of 
congressional dominance.
The unique situation in which Republi-
cans now find themselves—of Trump’s party 
yet, on substantial issues, opposing him—
clarifies these issues. They can restore the 
operation of the power motive in legislative 
politics. Defending their preferences against 
a president of their own party requires mak-
ing a case for institutional propriety in addi-
tion to policy. If the question is simply the 
latter, Trump, with his demagogic tenden-
cies, will have the upper hand. A clarifying 
conversation first needs to occur about the 
proper division of constitutional labor.
The dangers of “presentism”
Such a conversation demands a capacity to 
articulate why an understanding of consti-
tutionalism, starting with the separation 
of powers, matters. In Federalist No.  47, 
Madison strikingly calls the combination 
of powers “the very definition of tyranny,” 
apparently regardless of how the powers are 
exercised. He is influenced by Montesquieu’s 
understanding that “political liberty in a 
citizen is that tranquility of spirit which 
comes from the opinion each one has of his 
security.” In a regime of blended powers, in 
which a single person or body wields the 
actuality or potential of arbitrary author-
ity, no one can be confident of his security 
because no one can be sure what the sover-
eign will do next. For President Trump to be 
the citizens’ “voice” in a regime of function-
ally combined authorities would so empower 
him. Even his benevolent exercise of them 
would disrupt the tranquility of a thought-
ful citizen. (Tranquility is one condition for 
investment, among other things. It is not too 
far a stretch to wonder whether an individu-
al’s willingness to invest in a business might 
be affected by the knowledge that a single 
authority, acting through the person of the 
president, can—without any balancing 
authority—exert pressure that determines 
where it locates its manufacturing.)
The concentration of powers in a single 
voice also presumes the desirability, not to 
say possibility, of a unified national will in 
a nation of 319 million people. Congress, 
because of its multiplicity and its necessary 
parochialism, is better positioned institu-
tionally to register the subtlety and variety 
of views in a diverse and extensive republic. 
Trump’s voice, like that of any president, is 
necessarily binary, operating on behalf of 
those who agree with him. Those who do not 
agree are on the outs, often for the fullness of 
a four-year term. Congress, by contrast, is far 
abler to represent the multifarious spectrum 
of American political beliefs.
The legislative branch is more sedate and 
deliberate in decision making than the exec-
utive as well. It is designed to be. Bicameral-
ism requires two proverbial keys to launch 
a missile. Initially, Madison reminds us, the 
House and Senate were differently consti-
tuted to complicate combinations; even now, 
their distinct cultures make cooperation at 
least somewhat more challenging than it 
would otherwise be. The legislative process 
entails compromise and consensus. It takes 
time, which enables passions to dissipate 
and reason to take hold. The Senate plays 
an especially important role in ensuring that 
the “cool and deliberate sense of the com-
munity . . . ultimately prevail[s]” rather than 
the impulsive rule of “irregular passion[s].”
Congressional primacy is, in this sense, 
the appropriate vehicle for republican govern-
ment, for the deliberate self-rule of political 
man. Congress is a forum in which individu-
als cannot demand all they want: to get some, 
they must give some. It is a place where, as 
Tocqueville understood, private and public 
goods converge, where personal participation 
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in the public good is meaningful because 
both are maintained. The personal is not 
wholly absorbed in the political, but neither 
is the public wholly subsumed in the selfish.
It is not this way in presidential politics. 
To the limited extent to which presidents 
can claim to speak for the people, it is the 
people as a mass movement and homoge-
neous force, not as individuals maintain-
ing their distinct identities and ambitions. 
When combined with a personality cult, 
wholesale presidentialism entails an abdica-
tion of the individual to a parental figure 
whose locutions have emulated his pre-
decessor’s obsessive use of the first-person 
singular: “I am the only one who can make 
America great again!” “I alone can fix it.” “I 
am your voice.” 
In the person of a president, as in the 
teeth of populist movements, decisions can 
be made on impulse. This is true of any pres-
ident, but especially of a populist one. (That 
Trump insists on maintaining his tweet-
ing habit—using his personal account for, 
among other purposes, taunting his media 
critics—suggests impulsivity is a personality 
trait he has yet to tame.) Presidential deci-
sions are, in a sense, antipolitical: the work of 
a single, undifferentiated “voice,” in Trump’s 
formulation. There is no need for conversa-
tion or trade-offs. 
Legislative primacy as part of a system of 
separated powers contributes to another, and 
related, conservative goal: the diffusion of 
power. It prevents a single authority, in this 
case the president, from either channeling or 
acting on mere will. This is only aggravated 
by the phenomenon of a president operating 
as a tribune of the people and concentrating 
the general will into a singularity. A president 
acting alone is powerful enough; a president 
powered by a public will for which he alone 
alleges the moral authority to speak is too 
much power to concentrate on any one head. 
Trump seems determined to stoke public 
passions. Federalist No. 71, by contrast, says 
this of presidents: “When occasions present 
themselves, in which the interests of the 
people are at variance with their inclinations, 
it is the duty of the persons whom they have 
appointed, to be the guardians of those inter-
ests; to withstand the temporary delusion, in 
order to give them time and opportunity for 
more cool and sedate reflection.” Trump’s 
apparent unwillingness to play this part 
makes the Senate’s cooling function all the 
more important.
Constitutionalism matters for other rea-
sons that should appeal to conservatism to the 
extent it actually aspires to conserve. The con-
stitutional regime is the work of generations. 
A growing body of literature, much of it lean-
ing libertarian, holds that the Constitution 
is binding because it is good for us here and 
now. Madison had warned of “the hazards 
and difficulties incident to [constitutional] 
experiments, and of the great imprudence 
of unnecessarily multiplying them,” but on 
contemporary libertarian accounts, constitu-
tional experiments are an eternal recurrence. 
Randy Barnett, for example, argues that laws 
can “bind in conscience” only to the extent 
that they can be certified to be just. 
Conservatism is incidental to these 
accounts, or rather coincidental. It is pure 
happenstance that the thing that is good for 
us today existed in the past and therefore 
ought to be conserved. If the good Consti-
tution or just laws did not originate behind 
us, we would be compelled to scan the 
horizon in search of them. On this model, 
progressivism might easily be exchanged for 
conservatism; nothing morally commends 
the one over the other. Better put, the model 
is neither, for conservatism locates substan-
tive value in custom, while progressivism’s 
method is inherently focused on the future. 
The libertarian method might more aptly 
be described not as conservatism or as pro-
gressivism but rather as presentism, and it 
will not succeed as a brief for constitutional 
obligation. If the terms of the conversation 
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are what works today, Americans will rea-
sonably ask why a 230-year-old document 
should inhibit their contemporary policy 
preferences. If, they will wonder, the Con-
stitution straitjackets us—inhibiting, for 
instance, the immediate accomplishment 
of the Trump agenda—and if the criterion 
of wisdom is what suits us today, why not 
unshackle ourselves? There are current and 
self-interested reasons not to, of course: 
immediate and impulsive self-government 
often does not serve the public’s own good. 
Still, an argument rooted in the present is 
necessarily hobbled in justifying a document 
written so distantly in the past.
By contrast, conservatism on the model 
theorized by Edmund Burke and restored to 
the American mind by the likes of Russell 
Kirk and William  F. Buckley can explain 
that obligation. It accords moral value to 
conservation. That is partly because con-
servatism, recognizing the limits of human 
reason, prefers concrete experience—Burke’s 
“collected reason of ages”—to instant and 
abstract reflection. It is, in this sense, better 
for us now to pay due respect to the past. 
But, more important, conservatism regards 
custom as authoritative because society is, as 
Burke said, a contract between the dead, the 
living, and those to be born. Burke conceived 
of liberties as an “entailed inheritance,” a 
metaphor that “furnishes a sure principle of 
conservation, and a sure principle of trans-
mission; without at all excluding a principle 
of improvement.”
The Framers, to be sure, were not 
Burkeans. But neither were they presentists. 
An American myth, a sort of ignoble lie, 
holds that our regime sprang forth from 
Philadelphia in the manner in which Burke 
satirized the revolutionary French Constitu-
tion: “ready made and ready armed, mature 
in its birth, a perfect goddess of wisdom and 
of war, hammered by our blacksmith mid-
wives out of the brain of Jupiter himself.” In 
fact, the American Constitution contains 
few devices that are not traceable to earlier 
colonial forms. “Experience must be our only 
guide,” John Dickinson had said at Philadel-
phia. “Reason may mislead us.” In that vein, 
while Hamilton speaks in Federalist No. 1 of 
forming a government based on “reflection 
and choice,” that reference is to the process 
of ratification, not the crafting of the regime 
itself. With respect to the latter, in Federalist 
No. 15, Hamilton calls experience “that best 
oracle of wisdom,” whereas Madison, in Fed-
eralist No. 52, urges his readers to “consult 
experience, the guide that ought always to be 
followed whenever it can be found.” 
Similarly, when Jefferson absurdly 
proposed that no law endure longer than 
nineteen years, which his demographic 
tables told him was the average span of a 
generation, Madison responded that while 
it was true the earth belonged to the living, 
“the improvements made by the dead form a 
charge against the living who take the ben-
efit of them. This charge can no otherwise 
be satisfied than by executing the will of the 
dead accompanying the improvements.” The 
Framers so understood themselves. James 
Wilson thus cautioned the Philadelphia Con-
vention that it was “providing a Constitution 
for future generations, and not merely for 
the peculiar circumstances of the moment.” 
(Wilson, protesting the colonial authority 
of Parliament in 1774, had similarly spoken 
intergenerationally in proclaiming that the 
Americans would, rather than surrendering 
their rights, “leave our posterity as free as our 
ancestors left us.”)
Among the striking facts of Trump’s vic-
tory is his wholesale routing of the conserva-
tive elite, virtually all of which was arrayed 
against him. One reason may have been that 
the elite spoke substantially in policy posi-
tions, which, being transient by nature, are 
vulnerable to capture. The moral obligation 
of intergenerationality, the philosophical 
core of conservative argument, offers more 
enduring and binding value. Yet conserva-
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tives are less accustomed recently to making 
this case in conserving terms.
Congressional Republicans, or at least 
their leadership, seem aware of the moral 
importance of intergenerationality. Speaker 
Ryan admonished candidate Trump that he 
had “inherited” the party of Lincoln and 
Reagan. Trump, however, replied, via Twit-
ter, in terms that suggested an awareness 
only of the now: “Wrong, I didn’t inherit it, 
I won it with millions of voters!” That all-is-
now mentality cannot be true of a political 
party that has existed for more than 160 
years. If the Republican Party belongs to 
Trump in the same manner as a Midtown 
high-rise, can he demolish it? Would it be 
his prerogative to remodel it by swapping out 
its fundamental principles while retaining its 
brand name? The Burkean answer is that 
he cannot: debts are owed, to Lincoln, to 
Coolidge, to Taft, to Dirksen, to Goldwater, 
to Reagan, and, yes, in time, to Trump—but 
also to future generations to whom the work 
of those statesmen must be transmitted.
 If this is true of a party, it is far truer 
of a constitution. The constitutional inheri-
tance is not merely a gift to be expended 
or consumed; it is a responsibility to be 
stewarded. This sense of intergenerational 
obligation—debts to the past and future—is 
the most solid and powerful grounding for 
originalism and respect for constitutional 
form. In his introduction to the Liberty 
Fund edition of Burke’s Reflections, Francis 
Canavan, noting Hume’s observation that 
“human society is in perpetual flux,” writes: 
“In this everlasting continuity, which secures 
that the human race shall never be wholly 
old or wholly new, lies the guarantee for the 
existence of civilization.” We, too, stand on 
a continuum with our founders, as they did 
with their ancestors. We are free to modify 
their work, to be sure, but should do so mod-
estly and reverently. We owe this both to 
those from whom we inherited it and those 
to whom we will pass it down. 
Our Fourth of July rhetoric notwith-
standing, Americans are a more naturally 
conserving than a revolutionary people. 
Patriotism is that: it is not a celebration of 
contemporary interest or of a future to be 
conquered. It is an essentially backward-
looking virtue, one rooted in shared history. 
Our legendary, critics claim excessive, rever-
ence for the Constitution arises largely from 
a sense of obligation and deference to cus-
tom, combined with a duty to generations 
to come, not from an immediate apprecia-
tion of constitutional excellence. An appeal 
to that sense can persuade. But the appeal 
must be made.
Will Congress exert its prerogatives?
Congressional Republicans must therefore 
argue that policymaking is a prerogative 
belonging to them. They are in no position to 
ace Trump out. The regime has passed pure 
congressional supremacy by. Madison, assent-
ing to the constitutionality of the national 
bank whose legitimacy he once bitterly 
opposed, said enduring practice ratified by 
the people acting through all three branches 
of government could settle—he seems really 
to have meant “alter”—constitutional mean-
ing. This need not scandalize; it is no more 
than Burkean prescription, the idea that 
long possession creates a rightful title. It is 
constitutionalism as a heavy anchor in deep 
water, not actually tethered to the bottom but 
exerting sufficient drag that any motion is 
imperceptibly slow. The motion in the direc-
tion of the presidency is now undeniable. A 
regime in which the president is at least an 
equal partner in policymaking is here to stay. 
But that means Congress has at least an equal 
place to claim as well, in addition to some 
authorities—taxation, declaring war, appro-
priating funds—that are clearly its own.
If the vagueness of Trump’s policy posi-
tions provides an opening for Congress to fill 
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in the details, so does the unconservatism of 
many of the positions he has specified. There 
are voices of constitutional independence 
in both chambers: Ben Sasse in the Senate, 
Justin Amash in the House. Ryan may be 
another: he has, for example, championed 
Medicare reform. The president’s apologists 
say that, given that Trump was not elected 
on this issue, it should not be pressed. Com-
mentator Ann Coulter, for one, suggested 
that if Ryan wants to reform Medicare, he 
should run for the White House. This is 
exactly why Ryan should press the issue, if 
only as a matter of constitutional instruc-
tion. Trump can veto a Medicare bill. He has 
that power, and was elected to wield it. Let it 
be seen that constitutional conflict will not 
sink the republic. It may help resurrect it.
There will also be tests where members 
of Congress do agree with the president. 
F. H. Buckley, a legal scholar and Trump 
supporter, proposed that President Trump’s 
Department of Education emulate President 
Obama’s in using “Dear Colleague” letters, 
for instance. The Obama Education Depart-
ment used these to push its diversity agenda; 
Buckley argues that the Trump administra-
tion should use them to push viewpoint 
diversity. Yet as Peter Lawler has observed, if 
administrative imposition is constitutionally 
flawed in one case, as congressional Repub-
licans correctly argued it was, it is flawed in 
the other. Here, too, Congress must stand 
for its prerogatives.
The great question pertains less to the 
Sasses and Amashes, or to the Ryans, than 
to those who disagree with Trump on policy 
but have not yet articulated a constitutional 
vision of Congress’s role. This moment is 
their test. If Congress is prostrate now, 
Republicans will have no claim to consti-
tutionalism. Nor would they have any title 
to authority, for their only claim to hold 
it would be to have emptied it of content. 
Voters would be entitled to inquire into their 
motives. Why would an otherwise success-
ful person expose himself to the indignities 
and costs of campaigning, interrupt a career 
that might otherwise have been lucrative and 
often already was, bear separation from fam-
ily and the other burdens of office, merely 
to serve as a handmaiden to presidents or, 
at best, a safety brake on their behavior? 
The former smacks of the hangers-on at a 
medieval court. It was the sort of behavior 
that instantaneously normalized Trump, as 
in then-RNC chair Reince Priebus’s declara-
tion to ABC’s George Stephanopoulos that 
a Trump victory would not split the party 
because “winning is the antidote to a lot of 
things.”
By reputation, Ryan and his Senate coun-
terpart, Mitch McConnell, are not courtiers. 
Between their Reaganism and Trump’s 
Trumpism probably lies a new approach to 
conservative policy. But conservatism must 
ultimately be about Madisonianism. If so, 
the question is how self-conscious they are 
about what conservatism aspires to conserve. 
The questions confronting conservatism 
demand a return to first constitutional 
principles, and it falls to these congressional 
leaders to articulate them. That makes this 
the conservative constitutional moment. 
Will constitutional conversation be 
compelling politically? Will the voters care 
whether a policy is of Congress born, so 
long as its substance is to their liking? If not, 
Madison might wonder of the Americans in 
2016 what he did of the ancient Greeks in 
Federalist No.  38: Why would a people so 
jealous of their liberty be driven to “consider 
one illustrious citizen [Solon or Lycurgus] 
as a more eligible depository of the fortunes 
of themselves and their posterity, than a 
select body of citizens, from whose common 
deliberations more wisdom, as well as more 
safety, might have been expected?” Trump’s 
supporters claimed they wanted constitu-
tional restoration. This is their constitutional 
moment too.  
